as salaamu alaykum,
Consider this an opportunity to expound upon your (or that of your favorite scholar) theory of metaethics. It can be a form of dawah to those interested in or struggling with this topic here.
I am interested in the compatibility between Islamic theories of metaethics with a secular theory of metaethics called "moral sense theory" or "moral sentimentalism". When I say metaethics, I refer to the factors behind moral judgments, such as whether a judgment corresponds the extrinsic properties of the natural world (natural law), the decrees of the deities (divine command theory), or the sentiments of moral agents (moral sentimentalism). I am not referring to specific moral judgments about whether wearing a hijab is a good thing, the permissibility of killing an individual under certain circumstances, or the morality of homosexual acts. A theory of metaethics should identify the factors behind the judgment that wearing a hijab is good (or even fard) or that homosexuality is wrong.
My personal assessment of Islamic philosophy is that there theory of metaethics is woefully unsophisticated and underdeveloped, especially in relation to modern secular theories. (I do not share this assessment with its theories of metaphysics and epistemology, since I admire the Ash`ari school's contributions on that.) Most Muslims subscribe to a strong form of divine command theory, which often corresponds to the notion that Allah, SWT, has decreed a law for humanity to follow that supersedes human custom and current moral trends. Essentially, Muslims tend to subscribe to the horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma where "what is pious is pious because the gods had deemed it as such" not that "the gods love what is pious because it pious due to some external standard".
One criticism that I had personally heard is that separating morality from religion is that it makes morality subject and a matter of personal opinion. Of course, the purpose of bringing up the Euthyphro dilemma polemically is to illustrate that theistic morality is also based on the fiat of God and not grounded in anything objective (such as a Platonic form) outside the capricious volition of God.
I reject hard divine command theory, and I personally subscribe to moral sentimentalism. There are two facts that I will use to argue for moral sentimentalism:
(1) The irreligious can be the subject of moral approbation (approval). The irreligious do things that evoke feelings of pleasure in us, such exhibiting munificence, displaying courage, and having an amicable demeanor.
(2) The irreligious can render valid moral judgments, without any influence from religious morality
Since moral judgments have to extend beyond one's own direct personal interest and concern the welfare of other individuals, the sentiment of sympathy for other individuals is what mediates many moral judgments. Most theories of moral sentimentalism emphasize that human benevolence is mostly due its their capacity for sympathy. Morality then becomes the moral judgments of individuals and the sentiments that drives those judgments.
One radical implication of moral sentimentalism that I had immediately recognized is that the Sharia (more precisely fiqh) has little to do with morality. For instance, in most people, the mild consumption of alcohol and small-scale gambling would not elicit feelings of disgust, since there is no discernible harm in the consequences of those actions. Again, while those actions do evoke any sentiment in irreligious people, in the mumineen, they are deterred from doing those actions (according to the strength of one's taqwa). I would say that the deterrence is due to the understanding that the prohibition of alcohol is not a frivolous element but a direct command of Allah, SWT, and that the thought of violating it conflicts with one's own ideal conception of themselves as a Muslim and that would elicit feelings of displeasure directed towards oneself. Islam can be made compatible with moral sentimentalism by making taqwa an artificial virtue (among Muslims) where everything annexed with it can elicit the appropriate sentiments of approbation and disapprobation regarding certain actions.
I understanding that many Muslims may think that the picture presented by moral sentimentalists sounds too benign, and that divine sanction and obligation is necessary to enjoin proper conduct. The human moral faculties cannot be trusted to discern what is good. I would say that human nature is good according to the fitrah and it can discern what is hasan.
For more: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Moral Sentimentalism", SEP "Hume's Moral Theory", SEP "Religion and Morality", Wiki "Moral Sense Theory"
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